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CRISIS CONSTRUCTION IN CONTRACT
BOILERPLATE
EMILY STRAUSS *
I
INTRODUCTION
Why might judges interpret a boilerplate contractual clause to reach a result
clearly at odds with its plain language? Though courts don’t acknowledge it, one
reason might be the economy. Boilerplate provisions are pervasive and enforcing
some common clauses as written might cause additional upheaval during an
economic crisis. Under such circumstances, particularly where other government
interventions to shore up the market are exhausted, courts may step in to help
restore investor confidence.
In the past, a number of scholars have argued that this is an important
function of lawmakers generally. Under this theory, because the economy
operates differently in times of crisis, specifically when interest rates near zero,
the law should function differently as well.1 In normal economic times,
policymakers can decrease interest rates to stimulate demand and spur a
stagnating economy by incentivizing people to spend rather than save. However,
when interest rates near zero, as they did during the Great Depression and the
Great Recession, this tool is unavailable. Under these circumstances, the theory
goes, the law should be adjusted to produce decisions that restore confidence and
activity in the market.
In this Article, I argue that courts have in fact done this. In the aftermath of
the financial crisis, residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) trusts, which
held pools of loans and issued securities to investors, sued securities sponsors en
masse on contracts warranting the quality of the mortgages sold to the trusts.
These contracts almost universally contained provisions requiring sponsors to
repurchase individual noncompliant loans. Significantly, this was the “sole
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1. See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 34 YALE
J. ON REG. 791, 838 (2017) (“If law should be efficient and what is efficient changes with the business
cycle . . . law should be different at the zero lower bound than at times in which the interest rate exceeds
zero.”) (emphasis omitted).
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remedy” for bad loans available to the trusts under the contractual language.2
Due to the sheer volume of bad loans in these pools following the mortgage crisis,
however, it was prohibitively expensive and cumbersome for trustees to enforce
repurchase of these loans on an individual basis. The clause therefore benefited
sponsors, who argued that it must be enforced as written. Recent scholarship has
explained how enforcing these provisions would effectively leave trustees
without a meaningful remedy for the vast pools of fraudulent or otherwise
noncompliant loans that they had bought.3
Despite the unambiguous language of the sole remedy provision, in the
aftermath of the crisis court after court held that trustees and other parties to
these contracts could claim damages by sampling the loan pools and calculating
breach and damages based on the sample, rather than forcing repurchase loanby-loan.4 Although this approach was facially inconsistent with the plain text of
the sole remedy provision, these decisions gave trustees, and through them
investors, the leverage to salvage millions—even billions—of dollars in
settlements from the sponsors and originators who had made the shoddy loans.
These decisions are generally not paragons of clarity. They did not rely on classic
contract doctrines; initially, they relied on dubiously applied precedent, or on no
reasoning at all. However, as these cases permitting sampling accumulated, later
opinions came to rely on each other, creating a judicial echo chamber; for a time,
judges cited the general consensus permitting sampling, even though it was
contrary to the contractual language.
I argue that these decisions were an exercise in “crisis construction.” This
term refers to the act of interpreting a contract in light of the general economic
turmoil existing at the time. Although the decisions permitting sampling
generally do not include transparent reasoning, it appears that bolstering investor
confidence—and thus stabilizing demand for mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs), which was virtually paralyzed at the time—was a key consideration in
disregarding the loan-by-loan repurchase requirement. The timing of these
decisions suggests that a broader assessment of economic conditions motivated
the decisions relaxing the requirement of loan-by-loan proof in the years
immediately following the crisis. But as the years went by and the economy began
to recover, judges gradually retrenched. Decisions appearing after 2015 generally
adhered to the plain language of the contracts, and held that parties must prove
2. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine
Regarding Sampling at 14–15, MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2010 WL 5186702 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2010) (No. 602825/2008) (“In this case, the Transaction Documents negotiated by the
parties, which form the basis of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, provide that Plaintiff’s sole remedy
for any alleged breach is loan-by-loan repurchase or substitution.”).
3. See Tracy Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Unenforceable Portfolio Contracts, 37 YALE J. ON REG.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at t24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3361222
[https://perma.cc/ZHP5-4N7] (“[Trustees] had no effective legal rights: their cost of enforcing the
contracts as written–i.e., loan-by-loan, were prohibitive.”) (emphasis omitted).
4. Largely in New York, although these decisions occasionally pop up in other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. WMC Mortg., LLC, Nos. 3:12-cv-933 (CSH), 3:12-cv-969 (CSH),
3:12-cv-1699 (CSH), 3:13-cv-1347 (CSH), 2014 WL 3824333, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2014).
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liability and damages loan-by-loan. While this reversal may seem arbitrary, I
argue that it may have been a response to improving economic circumstances.
While greater transparency in this line of crisis construction could provide greater
certainty to courts and market participants, it is possible that the opacity of the
current approach may enable more efficient outcomes by allowing courts to
quietly bolster investor confidence in times of crisis.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of enforcement, the loan-by-loan repurchase
remedy still regularly appears in MBS contracts. Existing scholarly theories of
sticky boilerplate provisions may contribute to explaining this endurance.5 I
argue that in addition, specific events following the financial crisis decreased the
perceived cost of retaining these provisions. First, it appears that some provisions
of Dodd-Frank6 have decreased the likelihood of some of the most pervasive
breaches of MBS contracts, thus reducing the likelihood that plaintiffs would
have to prove those breaches loan-by-loan on a mass scale. Second, the existence
of the crisis construction decisions permitting sampling despite the loan-by-loan
repurchase requirement may have signaled to investors that, even in absence of
revision and the costs it would entail, courts probably would not leave them
without redress in another economic panic. Accordingly, parties may have
retained this provision in MBS contracts because the benefits of revision simply
did not outweigh the perceived costs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II gives background on the mortgage
market, the financial crisis, and the creation of MBSs, including the relevant
contracts. Part III describes first the rise of sampling in defiance of the repurchase
requirement in the aftermath of the crisis, and the decisions representing more
recent judicial retrenchment, which hold the plain language of these contracts to
require loan-by-loan proof. Part IV introduces the idea that contracts might be
interpreted differently in times of crisis, assesses whether this is an appropriate
role for courts, and examines legal bases for crisis construction. Specifically, it
addresses how the courts permitting sampling did so based on unsound
application of precedent, or with no reasoning at all, and why more conventional
mechanisms, such as classic contract doctrine, were not used. Part V evaluates
reasons for the persistence of these provisions. Part VI concludes.
II
BACKGROUND
A. The Mortgage Market and the Crisis
The MBS has been around for decades and is appealing to banks for a number
of reasons. Banks making mortgages dispense a large lump sum in return for a
stream of small payments. Simultaneously, they hold deposits which may be
5. See infra Part V.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113, 124
Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012)).
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demanded by customers at any time. This leads to a maturity mismatch, whereby
the bank’s liabilities (the demand deposits) are much more liquid than its assets
(the mortgages), potentially creating liquidity problems. Securitizing the
mortgages—bundling them together and selling bonds giving investors rights to
the mortgage payments—addresses this mismatch by giving banks a lump sum
instead of small mortgage payments over the term of the loan. Conversely,
investing in MBSs is attractive to investors for several reasons. As an initial
matter, the cash flows from mortgages are supposed to be relatively secure, on
the theory that people will seldom default on payments for the houses in which
they live. Moreover, MBSs are potentially even safer than individual mortgages
because the risk of default is diversified across many loans.7 In the run-up to the
financial crisis, securitization of residential mortgages became increasingly
appealing as a result of banking rules allowing banks to retain less capital for such
securities than for other types of assets.8 Private-label securitizations put together
by Wall Street investment banks took over an increasing share of the secondary
mortgage market.9
In the 1990s, lenders increasingly expanded into the subprime market,
extending mortgages to homebuyers with weak credit scores, assets, and
borrowing history.10 Concurrently, many lenders developed new loan products
that not only embraced borrowers with weaker credit, but required little or no
verification of important metrics such as income and assets. The non-traditional
mortgage market increased from twenty percent of all mortgages in 2003 to fifty
percent in 2006.11 Lenders wrote more than $13.4 trillion in subprime mortgages,
and total mortgage debt nearly doubled between 2002 and 2006.12 Underwriting
standards degraded, but high ratings by credit rating agencies and the opaque
structure of MBSs and other financial products made it difficult for investors to
monitor the quality of the underlying mortgages.13
As the issuance of home loans exploded, RMBSs were increasingly used as
collateral in short-term funding markets and derivatives positions, creating an
enormous interconnected system dependent on the value of these assets. As
housing prices began to collapse, borrowers, no longer able to refinance, began
to default on their mortgages. The subsequent downward spiral and contagion
are well documented; the credit ratings of many RMBSs were downgraded, and
7. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 59 (2016).
8. See Roberta Romano, Pitfalls of Global Harmonization of Systemic Risk Regulation in a World
of Financial Innovation, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT
CRASH 7 (Douglas W. Arner et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (“[D]omestic and foreign banks were
incentivized to hold RMBS written on those subprime assets by Basel capital requirements.”).
9. Patricia A. McCoy & Susan Wachter, Representations and Warranties: Why They Did Not Stop
the Crisis, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 289, 291 (Lee Anne Fennell
& Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017).
10. See id. (“[D]uring the boom, there was a substantial increase in nontraditional mortgages,
including . . . subprime loans and other Alt-A products . . . .”).
11. Id.
12. BARR, supra note 7, at 60.
13. Id.
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institutions were forced to recognize billions of dollars in losses.14 The collapse of
giants such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, WaMu and AIG necessitated
unprecedented government intervention, and led to the worst recession since the
Great Depression.
And then the lawsuits began.
B. RMBS Contracts: Representations, Warranties, Repurchase, and the Sole
Remedy Provision
The litigation in the aftermath of the financial crisis was extensive, and even
ten years after the crisis is still far from over. Lawsuits by investors have dwindled
because of the relatively short limitations periods imposed by federal securities
laws15 and most state blue sky laws.16 However, MBSs are creatures of contract,
and much of the financial crisis litigation that remains is composed of contract
claims, which typically have longer statutes of limitations.17 To understand the
context for this litigation, it is important to understand the structure of a MBS,
and the players involved in making one.
To securitize assets like mortgages, the entity seeking to raise cash—typically
called the sponsor—transfers the assets to a special purpose entity (SPE).18 The
SPE is often organized as a trust, so that the assets it contains are remote from
the potential bankruptcy of the sponsor.19 Once the SPE owns the assets, it issues
certificates that investors can buy.20 The assets are typically sold to the trust
pursuant to a complex set of contracts, which are discussed below. Further, to
receive a higher credit rating—and thus a higher price—for the certificates,
sponsors may arrange to have the most credit-worthy tranche of the securities
insured.21 Under this arrangement, a third party—called a financial guaranty or
monoline insurer—makes payments to investors if the cash flows from the assets
underlying the certificates decline below a predetermined amount.22
Accordingly, lawsuits based on these contracts involve claims between the
trust, the insurer, and the sponsor. The general theme is that trustees—often sued
themselves by investors —sue the sponsors on the ground that the mortgages in
the pool breached the contractual representations and warranties under which
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012) (one- to three-year limitations period for Securities Act claims);
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 638 (2010) (two- to five year limitations period for 10b-5 claims).
16. See ROGER J. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 8:13 (2018).
17. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2016) (stating that the limitations period on contract
claims in New York is six years).
18. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 6 (2004). These special purpose entities are sometimes called special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. See Ronald S. Borod, Belling the Cat: Taming the Securitization Beast Without Killing It, 31 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 643, 652 (2012) ([M]onoline guarantors [ran] their own independent stress tests
before agreeing to issue financial guarantees of the senior tranches of the securitization structures . . . .”).
22. VINOD KOTHARI, SECURITIZATION: THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE FUTURE 219–20
(2006).
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they were sold. Insurers were forced to pay out when mortgages defaulted and
RMBSs plummeted in value; indeed, most monoline insurers did not survive the
crisis.23 These insurers were third-party beneficiaries to the sponsors’ contracts
with the trusts, and therefore entitled to sue for the breach of the representations
and warranties. Insurers also had their own contracts called Indemnity and
Insurance agreements (I&Is) under which they brought claims against the
sponsors. A more detailed review of these contracts and the relevant clauses
follows.
The primary contracts governing the sale of mortgages to the trust are the
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (MLPA) and the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement (PSA). The trustee and the sponsor are the parties to both contracts,
and insurers may be specifically named as third-party beneficiaries. The meat of
these agreements consists of representations and warranties spelling out the
required attributes of the mortgage loans underlying the security. These
representations and warranties are designed to help address the information
asymmetries inherent in the securitization process; inevitably, originators of the
mortgages know more about the underlying loans than the trustees and
ultimately the investors do.24 While these representations and warranties vary
across securitizations, they often include representations that the loans conform
to specified or industry-standard underwriting guidelines; that the properties
securing the mortgages have been properly appraised; that no mortgage is in
default or seriously delinquent; that the loan is legal, marketable, and
enforceable; that no party made any misrepresentations with respect to the
mortgage loan; and that the information provided by the seller about the
mortgage loans is complete, true, and correct.25
These contracts also spell out the mechanism for enforcing the
representations and warranties. Once the sponsor or trustee discovered a loan in
breach of the representations and warranties, the sponsor had several options.
First, if possible, the sponsor could correct or cure the breach within 60 days of
notice of the breach. Second, the sponsor could substitute a compliant loan into
the pool in exchange for the defective one. Third, and most relevant in the
aftermath of the crisis, the sponsor could repurchase the loan.26 These
23. See Barnet Sherman, Paying for Protection: The Return of Bond Insurers, FORBES (Jan. 14,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2016/01/14/paying-for-protection-the-return-of-bondinsurers/#2d5a0ca5082e [https://perma.cc/E926-SHLX] (stating that just two bond insurance companies
survived the financial crisis).
24. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 9, at 293 (discussing the agency problems resulting from the
securitization process).
25. See id. at 294–95; see also Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t4 n.9 (listing sample
representations and warranties).
26. See, e.g., Pooling & Servicing Agreement, SACO I Tr. 2006-5 at 930, SACO I Tr. 2006-5 v. EMC
Mortg. LLC, No. 651820/2012, slip op. 31432(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2014) (“Upon discovery by either
the Company or the Purchaser of a breach of any of the foregoing representations and warranties which
materially and adversely affects the value of the Mortgage Loans or the interest of the Purchaser in any
Mortgage Loan, the party discovering such breach shall give prompt written notice to the other. The
Company shall have a period of sixty (60) days from the earlier of its discovery or its receipt of notice of
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mechanisms were designed to be the only means by which trustees could recover
for breaches of the representations and warranties. 27 In effect, the agreements
established an exchange mechanism once the period expired for cure: the sponsor
would tender a contractually agreed-upon repurchase price, and the trustee
would return the loan, distributing the repurchase monies to the
certificateholders.
C. Loan-By-Loan Repurchase and the Difficulties of Enforcement
The plain language of the repurchase provisions contemplates a remedy to be
instituted on a loan-by-loan basis. Several other features of the contracts
reinforce this conclusion. First, the applicable representations and warranties
themselves refer to individual loans, rather than to the pool as a whole.28 Second,
the PSAs require that breaching loans must be repurchased for a specific
repurchase price. That price is defined in terms that are only applicable to
individual loans, as each loan has a different value for each component of the
repurchase price.29 Relatedly, the PSAs include detailed provisions for allocating
the income from the loans—including repurchase monies—to investors. These
provisions break down payments into principal and interest components, which
are allocated differently to different classes of certificateholders.30 However,
principal and interest amounts can only be determined loan-by-loan.31

any such breach within which to correct or cure such breach. The Company hereby covenants and agrees
that if any such breach is not corrected or cured within such sixty day period, the Company shall, at the
Purchaser’s option and not later than ninety (90) days of its discovery or its receipt of notice of such
breach, repurchase such Mortgage Loan at the Repurchase Price or . . . substitute a Mortgage Loan as
provided below.”).
27. See, e.g., id. at 39 (“It is understood and agreed that the obligation under this Agreement of
[sponsor] to cure, repurchase or replace any Mortgage Loan as to which a breach has occurred and is
continuing shall constitute the sole remedies against [sponsor] (in its capacity as Sponsor) respecting such
breach available to the Certificateholders, the Depositor or the Trustee.”); see also Lewis & Schwartz,
supra note 3, at t5 n.11 (listing other sample repurchase and sole remedy provisions).
28. See, e.g., id. at 927–28 (“The Mortgage creates a valid, subsisting and enforceable first lien . . . .”;
“All payments due prior to the related Cut-off Date for such Mortgage Loan have been made as of the
related Closing Date . . . there are no material defaults under the terms of the Mortgage Loan . . . .”; “The
Mortgage File contains an appraisal of the related Mortgaged Property signed prior to the final approval
of the mortgage loan application by a Qualified Appraiser, approved by the Company, who had no
interest, direct or indirect, in the Mortgaged Property or in any loan made on the security thereof, and
whose compensation is not affected by the approval or disapproval of the Mortgage Loan . . . .”); see also
Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t4 n.9 (providing further examples of loan-level representations and
warranties, with assurances that “[m]any more such citations are available”).
29. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to U.S. Bank’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 10–11, SACO I Tr. 2006-5 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, No. 651820/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 7, 2015) (stating that the repurchase price equals “the sum of (i) 100% of the outstanding principal
balance of the Mortgage Loan as of the date of such purchase plus (ii) accrued interest thereon at the
applicable Mortgage Rate reduced by any portion of the Servicing Fee, Servicing Advances and
Advances payable to the purchaser of the Mortgage Loan plus (iii) any costs and damages (if any)
incurred by the Trust in connection with any violation of such Mortgage Loan of any anti-predatory
lending laws”).
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id.

BOOK PROOF - STRAUSS - NO TC (DO NOT DELETE)

170

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

11/9/2019 9:59 AM

[Vol. 82:163

Third, the repurchase remedy contemplates an exchange by which the
sponsor pays the repurchase price, and in return gets back the loan. The structure
of this remedy reflects a reality extensively explored by scholars of the financial
crisis: intermediation. When RMBSs are created, loans—often from many
different sources—are bought and sold through intermediaries, ultimately to be
deposited in the pool underlying the securitization.32 Many sponsors of such
securitizations, while they might originate some loans themselves, bought many
or most of their loans from other originators. Along with these purchases came
further sets of representations and warranties, accompanied by repurchase
remedies.33 Accordingly, such lawsuits proceeded up and down the
intermediation chain; to help make up the losses it incurred when obligated to
repurchase loans from a trust, a sponsor might concurrently or subsequently sue
the originator from whom it purchased those loans. Such serial repurchase
remedies, however, require the return of the actual defective loan.34
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, whether a loan “materially and
adversely” breached a representation or warranty is a loan-specific inquiry.35
Under the terms of RMBS contracts, a breach only gives rise to repurchase
obligations if it “materially and adversely affects the interests of the
Certificateholders in any Mortgage Loan.”36 The definition of “materially and
adversely” in this context has not been decisively resolved; trustees argue that
any breach increasing the risk of loss is material and adverse, while sponsors
maintain that breach is material and adverse only if it results in an actual loss on
the loan.37 But under either definition, the breach must be evaluated in light of
the loan’s other attributes. For example, a missing verification of employment
might impair the value of a loan. However, that impairment might not be material
and adverse if the borrower’s employment was exactly what he claimed, despite
the sponsor’s failure to verify it.38
Recent scholarship by Lewis and Schwartz has argued that the
representations and warranties cannot be enforced because the buyers of loan

32. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 9, at 299.
33. See e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to U.S. Bank’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, supra note 29, at 13.
34. Further means by which sponsors could mitigate losses from repurchase claims also include, if
the loan was not liquidated, benefiting from the remaining cash flow provided by the defective loan, or
selling it in the “Scratch and Dent” market. See id.
35. See id. at 17; see also Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t21 (“[T]o enforce the originating bank’s
input warranty, the portfolio buyer would have to establish for each nonperforming loan the cause of
default, and would also have to show that the customary screen would have uncovered that cause.”)
(emphasis omitted).
36. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to U.S. Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, supra note 29, at 17.
37. Id.; see also Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t6 n.12.
38. MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgs. Tr. 2006-OA2 v. UBS Real Estate Sec. Inc., No. 12-cv-7322
(PKC), 2015 WL 797972, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015).
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pools “could not observe at acceptable cost how the originating bank created the
portfolio loans.”39 To establish breach and enforce the repurchase remedy:
[T]he portfolio buyer would have to “get behind each nonperforming loan to learn how
it was made: did the originating bank check the borrower’s income and job status?
where she lived? what her credit rating was? Because the MBS portfolios that
originators purchased contained hundreds of loans, it was not economical for them to
check how each defaulting loan was made.40

Lewis and Schwartz also point to the difficulty of proving causation and
damages on a loan-by-loan basis as is clearly contemplated by the language of the
governing contracts.41
To make these determinations, litigants must “re-underwrite” the loans at
issue. Re-underwriting involves tracking down the loan files for the mortgages,
many of which have been moved from custodian to custodian over the years, and
may be missing documents.42 Recall that because of the relatively long limitations
period on contract claims, loans at issue could have originally been made over a
decade prior to re-underwriting. Usually litigants must then match the loan files
to the underwriting guidelines according to which the loan was supposed to be
underwritten. Guideline-matching is an expensive and error-prone process.
Then, the litigants must hire experts to assess the loan files and re-underwrite
them according to the guidelines. This involves sorting through the information
available to the original underwriter and re-making the decisions faced by that
underwriter. The process is inevitably guided by some subjective judgment. Reunderwriting a single loan file takes an expert roughly two to three hours and
costs $300-$400.43 There may be hundreds, or even thousands of loans per
securitization, and it is rare that only one securitization is the subject of a
lawsuit.44 Accordingly, as other scholars have pointed out, proving breach and
damages on a loan-by-loan basis is formidably—and often prohibitively—
costly.45

39. Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t5. While I appreciate the gravity of this point, the cost and
difficulties of re-underwriting a portfolio of MBS to determine liability and damages, though immense,
do not render these contracts unenforceable. It is more accurate to say that such contracts are expensive
and cumbersome to enforce as written in events of mass breach, such as occurred during the financial
crisis.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally, Richard E. Gottlieb, Brett J. Natarelli & Alexandra N. Hill, Two Trials and Other
Developments as RMBS Litigation Continues Unabated, 73 BUS. LAW. 497, 500 (2018) (“In most RMBS
cases, experts ‘reunderwrite’ the loans, meaning that they review the documents associated with the
loans’ origination to determine whether or not the loan originator complied with the applicable
underwriting guidelines.”).
43. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Nos. 11 Civ. 6188(DLC), 11 Civ. 6189(DLC),
11 Civ. 6190(DLC), 11 Civ. 6192(DLC), 11 Civ. 6193(DLC), 11 Civ. 6195(DLC), 11 Civ. 6196(DLC), 11
Civ. 6198(DLC), 11 Civ. 6200(DLC), 11 Civ. 6201(DLC), 11 Civ. 6202(DLC), 11 Civ. 6203(DLC), 11 Civ.
6739(DLC), 11 Civ. 7010(DLC), 11 Civ. 7048(DLC), 2012 WL 6000885 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012). In fact,
this estimate is probably conservative.
44. STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS § 5:13 (3d ed. 2019).
45. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 9, at 301; Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t5–t6.
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III
DEFIANCE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE: MORTGAGE PUT-BACK LITIGATION
The massive costs posed by loan-by-loan repurchase inspired plaintiffs’ firms
to promote an alternate strategy for recovery: sampling. The basic premise of
sampling is that, in order to avoid the time and expense of examining every single
loan in one or many securitizations, litigants, usually the plaintiff, draw a random
sample large enough to represent the population of at-issue loans, re-underwrite
those loans, and extrapolate their findings to the entire population. The appeal
of this approach is intuitive: basic statistical theory illustrates that a surprisingly
small random sample can generate a very accurate portrait of a much larger
population. Thus, plaintiffs under this theory could claim damages for the
proportion of breaching loans in the sample without undergoing the expense of
re-underwriting every loan in the securitization.
As discussed above, the plain language of the MLPAs and the PSAs clearly
contemplates loan-by-loan proof. Defendant sponsors repeatedly asserted this
argument, hoping that the burden of re-underwriting every loan in every
securitization would simply prove too much for putative plaintiffs, who might
abandon their lawsuits or settle for nominal amounts. However, in the years
following the crisis, courts declined again and again to hold that the plain
language of the contracts prohibited sampling. Accordingly, these lawsuits
proceeded, driving up settlement value and permitting trustees—and hence
investors—to extract recoveries for the shoddy loans that they held. Beginning
around 2015, however, courts began to retrench, finding that the plain language
of the MLPAs and PSAs barred sampling. This part explores the progression of
these cases.
A. The Brief Rise of Sampling
The progression of these cases can be divided into three phases. The first
phase involved monoline insurers, who, in return for a fee paid by the sponsors,
insured the highest rated tranches of many RMBSs. These insurers were thirdparty beneficiaries to the MLPAs and the PSAs. They also were parties to
separate I&I agreements with sponsors. Some of these I&I agreements included
broader transaction-level warranties that arguably exempted the insurers from
the sole remedy provision, and the difficulties it posed to proof by sample. These
early cases held that monoline plaintiffs were not precluded by the contracts from
proving their claims with samples of loans.
In the first of these cases, MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans,46 defendants argued, among other things, that MBIA, a monoline, was
precluded by the transaction agreements from proving its case through sampling,
and that it must prove that each individual loan breached the representations and

46. No. 602825/08, 2010 WL 5186702, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2010).
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warranties to enable Countrywide to repurchase that particular loan.47 Although
MBIA’s I&I contained broader transaction-level warranties that arguably
extended its remedies beyond the sole remedy provision,48 the court’s decision
did not seek to interpret the language in the contract. Indeed, the decision did
not even mention the language in any of the transaction agreements. It merely
held “Plaintiff’s proposed methodology of statistical sampling may be used at
trial.”49 Similarly, in MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC,50 a later court granted the monoline plaintiff’s partial motion for summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiffs may prove their case by using statistically
significant random sampling representative of the mortgage pool for liability and
damages.51 The court declined to address whether the transaction-level
warranties exempted MBIA from the sole remedy provision.52
Another case, Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. EMC Mortgage Corp.,53 provides
somewhat more satisfactory reasoning. In that case, Judge Crotty of the Southern
District of New York held that although the MLPAs and SSAs restricted parties
to loan-by-loan proof, monoline Syncora, a third-party beneficiary to these
agreements, was not limited to these remedies. Rather, restraints on Syncora’s
remedies were provided by the I&I. The I&I included broader transaction-level
warranties, and permitted Syncora to “take whatever action at law or equity as
may appear necessary” to collect on amounts or performance it was owed under
the agreements.54 Based on the language in the I&I, the court held that Syncora
was not subject to the remedial limitations of the MLPA and PSA and could
“seek a pool-wide remedy based on sampling and extrapolation.”55 As Syncora
illustrates, the decisions upholding sampling in this first phase could be grounded
in a potentially reasonable—if not always explicit—contractual interpretation
based on transaction-level warranties. The second phase in these decisions
consists of cases involving both monolines and trusts where courts declined to
hold that the sole remedy provision, even if applicable, barred sampling. Any
focus on contractual interpretation was all but abandoned in these decisions. In
47. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine Regarding
Sampling at 14–15, MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 602825/08, 2010 WL 5186702
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2010) (“In this case, the Transaction Documents negotiated by the parties, which
form the basis of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, provide that Plaintiff’s sole remedy for any alleged
breach is loan-by-loan repurchase or substitution . . . . MBIA has failed to explain how it can use
sampling to establish, as to each loan for which it asserts damages, that the loan breached a particular
representation or warranty.”) (emphasis and footnote omitted).
48. Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of its Motion In Limine Regarding
Sampling at 11, MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2010 WL 5186702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
22, 2010) (No. 602825/2008).
49. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2010 WL 5186702, at *5.
50. 927 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
51. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Approving Sampling, MBIA
Ins. Corp. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 927 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (No. 603751/2009).
52. Id.
53. No. 09 Civ. 3106(PAC), 2011 WL 1135007 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 2011).
54. Id. at *2 (emphasis omitted).
55. Id. at *4.
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another monoline case, Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. v. Flagstar Bank,
Judge Jed Rakoff held that Assured, a monoline plaintiff, was bound by the sole
remedy provision and that no language in the I&I mitigated this result.56
However, two years later, he held that Assured did not need to prove its losses
loan-by-loan because the loans at issue had defaulted, and Flagstar would
therefore “receive nothing back on defaulted loans.”57 Similarly, in Assured
Guaranty Municipal Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc., the court held as a
matter of law that the insurer need not submit loan-by-loan proof, and
confusingly declared that whether Assured was bound by the sole remedy
provision was a “red herring” in resolving this question.58 Citing no basis in the
text of the contract, the court held that “forcing [the insurer] to re-underwrite all
of the loans is commercially unreasonable and that sampling may be used to
compute damages.”59
During this second phase, courts began to apply the results from the original
monoline cases to cases involving trusts as plaintiffs. While at least some
monoline insurers were plausibly not bound to the repurchase remedy under the
transaction agreements, the same is not true of the trusts, which were not party
to the I&I and thus could not benefit from its potentially broader remedies.
Nonetheless, courts extended the reasoning, or lack thereof, in monoline cases to
hold that trusts could prove liability and damages by sample. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, these cases generally do not involve detailed assessments of the
contractual language. For instance, in Ace Securities Corp. 2007-HE-1 v. DB
Structured Products, the court found on a motion to dismiss that the repurchase
remedy “does not mean sampling cannot be used . . . . It is commercially
unreasonable to effectively re-underwrite the balance of the trust.”60
Similarly, the same court in Ace Securities Corp. 2006-SL2 v. DB Structured
Products stated in passing that the “parties must come up with a sampling
mechanism that meaningfully reflects the PSA’s damages calculation.”61
Subsequent orders allowing sampling in trustee repurchase litigation are even
more perfunctory.62 One of the few courts to elaborate on its reasoning allowing

56. No. 11 Civ. 2375(JSR), 2011 WL 5335566, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011).
57. Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. Flagstar Bank, 920 F. Supp. 2d 475, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). However,
this is unsatisfactory reasoning as even defaulted loans have value for the sponsor, who can enforce
repurchase rights further up the intermediation chain. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34.
58. No. 650705/2010, 2014 WL 3282310, at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2014).
59. Id. at *6.
60. No. 650327/2013, 2013 WL 6153206, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2013).
61. 965 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2013).
62. See, e.g., Judge Baer’s Response to Letter from Scott D. Musoff, Assured Guaranty Muni. Corp.
v. UBS Real Estate Secs. Inc., No. 12-cv-1579 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2013) (“I will allow sampling.”); Interim
Order, Home Equity Mortg. Tr. Series 2006-1 v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 156016/2012, slip op.
50011(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2019), NYSCEF Doc. No. 236 (“After review of plaintiffs’ November 11,
2013 correspondence, the court agrees that plaintiffs’ use of statistical sampling to prove liability and
damages would streamline the trial, promote judicial economy, and conserve the resources of the parties
and the court.”); Part 60 RMBS Put-Back Litig., No. 652001/13 at 6. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015) (“[T]he
courts have overwhelmingly endorsed statistical sampling and this Court concurs with that approach.”).
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sampling in a case involving trusts bound by the repurchase remedy relied heavily
on the general consensus that
[A]llowing the use of sampling is well-accepted by courts in RMBS cases . . . . [T]he
overwhelming majority of courts with RMBS cases that have considered sampling have
permitted it as a means to present proof at trial . . . . The Court adopts this consensus
reasoning here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment seeking a
ruling that ‘the use of statistical sampling to prove liability and damages on their claims
is consistent with the terms of the contract governing the transactions, including but not
limited to the PSAs’ is therefore granted.63

These rulings occurred in many procedural postures, including on motions to
dismiss, motions in limine, motions for interim orders, and motions for summary
judgment. As with any complex civil litigation, very few of these cases were
ultimately tried. Settlement figures are often not publicly available, but those that
are suggest a high settlement value for these cases; many settled for hundreds of
millions, even billions, of dollars.64 Accordingly, these decisions had significant
real-world effects, and enabled sizeable recoveries despite the facially prohibitive
plain language of the contracts.
B. Sampling’s Decline
Defendants protesting that the plain language of their contracts prohibited
sampling shouted into the wind for several years. Only recently, however, after
the miasma of the financial crisis had cleared, has this argument actually affected
litigation outcomes. During this third phase of RMBS repurchase litigation, the
tide turned, and courts began to bar sampling on the ground that it was prohibited
under the plain language of the transaction agreements.
Although some slightly earlier cases expressed skepticism regarding
sampling,65 the first decisions prohibiting it outright did not appear until 2015. In
MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA2 v. UBS (MARM-2006OA2), Judge Castel of the Southern District of New York bucked the dominant
63. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 15–17, SACO I Tr. 2006-5
v. EMC Mortg. LLC, No. 651820/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2015), NYSCEF Doc. No. 564.
64. See, e.g., $4.5 Billion Settlement With JPMorgan on Behalf of 21 Institutional Investors, GIBBS &
BRUNS LLP (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.gibbsbruns.com/timeline/4-5-billion-settlement-withjpmorgan-on-behalf-of-21-institutional-investors/ [https://perma.cc/U884-DN5N] ($4.5 billion in global
settlement with trustees); Kathryn Brenzel, UBS Pays $358M to Settle Assured’s RMBS Suit, LAW360
(May 6, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/438788 [https://perma.cc/W3GA-TGPB] ($358 million);
Karen Freifeld, JPMorgan Pays $400 Mln to Settle with Syncora Over Toxic Loans, REUTERS (Mar. 3,
2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/jpm-syncora-settlement-idUSL1N0M01D320140303?feedType/
=RSS&feedName=bondsNews [https://perma.cc/JZY5-N7BS] ($400 million); Brian Mahoney, MBIA,
BofA Strike Major $1.7B MBS Settlement, LAW360 (May 6, 2013), https://www.law360/
.com/articles/438947 [https://perma.cc/SRS4-C28T]; Nate Raymond, Flagstar Bancorp to Pay Assured
Guaranty $105 Mln Settlement, REUTERS (June 21, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/flagstarassured/flagstar-bancorp-to-pay-assured-guaranty-105-mln-settlement-idUSL2N0EX1PN20130621
[https://perma.cc/2ZDW-8ZRJ] ($105 million).
65. See Ret. Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of the City of Chi. v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, 775 F.3d 154, 162 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that a “sampling proposal fundamentally misses the
point”); In re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., No. 08-13555 at 54–55 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2014) (“[S]ometimes folks agree on some aspects of the use of statistical sampling and sometimes they
don’t.”).
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trend, holding that whether a breach “materially or adversely affected” the value
of a loan was inescapably a loan-by-loan inquiry that could not be squared with
sampling methodology.66
Other cases further rejecting sampling in the repurchase context soon
followed. A series of cases following the MARM 2006-OA2 decision appeared in
2016 and 2017, all of them prohibiting sampling on the ground that the repurchase
remedy and the sole remedy clause required loan-by-loan proof.67 By and large,
these cases do not discuss the previous decisions permitting sampling in trustee
litigation, and focus primarily on the contractual language; the sole exceptions
are twin opinions issued by Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn in BlackRock
Allocation Target Shares v. Wells Fargo Bank68 and Royal Park Investments
SA/NV v. HSBC Bank.69 These opinions were issued in the course of discovery
disputes (hence their resolution by a magistrate judge), and distinguish some of
the cases permitting sampling, such as the monoline cases which involved
transaction-level warranties.70 However, the opinions do not address the trustee
cases in which sampling was permitted.
IV
CRISIS CONSTRUCTION
The cases permitting sampling despite the plain language of the transaction
agreements represent an exercise in “crisis construction.” In this part, I argue that
the courts in these cases based their decisions not on the traditional tenets of
66. No. 12-cv-7322 (PKC), 2015 WL 797972, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015). In rejecting sampling,
Judge Castel reversed the order of his predecessor in this and a companion case, Assured v. UBS, supra
note 62. The court commented that “[i]t is a core function of a district court to manage cases. But that
function does not give the judge the prerogative of overriding the parties’ agreements in order to provide
an efficient and economical remedy in the name of a just and fair resolution.” 2015 WL 797972, at *4.
67. See, e.g., Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Sand Canyon Corp., No. 12 Civ. 5067 (JFK), 2017 WL
5256760, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2017) ([T]he Governing Agreements, as relevant here, call for loanby-loan proof of breaches of representations and warranties . . . .”); BlackRock Allocation Target Shares
v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Nos. 14-CV-09371 (KPF)(SN), 14-CV-09764 (KPF)(SN), 14-CV-10067
(KPF)(SN), 14-CV-10102 (KPF)(SN), 15-CV-10033 (KPF)(SN), 2017 WL 953550, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
10, 2017) (holding “that breaches be proven on a loan-by-loan basis”); U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. UBS
Real Estate Sec. Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 386, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he PSAs provide for ‘sole remedies’
that apply to breaches on an individualized loan-by-loan basis”); Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series
2006-FM2 v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 572, 585 (2017) (“[Plaintiff] is expressly limited
to the more specific Sole Remedy Provision negotiated by the parties, however many defective loans
there may be . . . .”).
68. Nos. 14-CV-09371 (KPF)(SN), 14-CV-09764 (KPF)(SN), 14-CV-10067 (KPF)(SN), 14-CV10102 (KPF)(SN), 15-CV-10033 (KPF)(SN), 2017 WL 953550, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017), order
clarified sub nom. BlackRock Allocation Target Shares: Series S Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n, Nos. 14 Civ. 9371 (KPF)(SN), 14 Civ. 9764 (KPF)(SN), 14 Civ. 10067 (KPF)(SN), 14 Civ. 10102
(KPF)(SN), 15 Civ. 10033 (KPF)(SN), 2017 WL 3610511 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017).
69. Nos. 14-CV-08175 (LGS)(SN), 14-CV-09366 (LGS)(SN), 14-CV-10101 (LGS)(SN), 15-CV02144 (LGS)(SN), 15-CV-10032 (LGS)(SN), 15-CV-10096 (LGS)(SN), 2017 WL 945099, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2017).
70. See BlackRock Allocation Target Shares, 2017 WL 953550, at *6; Royal Park Invs. SA/NV, 2017
WL 945099, at *6.
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contract construction, but on the desire to reassure investors. Many scholars have
argued that the law should change in response to economic panics and
recessions.71 Other scholars have addressed how courts, in particular, should
respond to such crises.72 Although some contend that courts were largely
unresponsive to the financial crisis,73 others have identified highly strategic
judicial responses to some of the crisis’ tensest moments,74 and still others have
argued that the law itself should be different in times of economic crisis to
accommodate results seemingly at odds with standard doctrine.75 A related
scholarly proposal argues that the law, including courts, should promote demand
when interest rates are at or near zero because under these circumstances, the
economy functions differently.76 Under this theory, legal decisions, including
judicial ones, should aim to reassure investors such that they are more inclined to
reenter the market, thus helping to stabilize the economy. But no literature has
gone so far as to advocate for the abandonment of a contract’s plain language
during times of crisis.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, this is exactly the approach
some courts took. At the time, the demand for MBSs had virtually collapsed, and
could not be meaningfully revived for years despite herculean government
efforts. This paralysis was in part a crisis of investor confidence in the
enforceability of MBS contracts; investors were reluctant to buy MBSs when it
seemed that sponsors could not be induced to stand behind the warranties they
had made. I argue that for several years—until interest rates and the market for

71. For example, Schwarcz has proposed a normative balancing framework for determining when
changes in financial markets should drive legal changes. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to
Address Changing Markets: A Consequence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017, at
163, 164. Other literature assesses more specific areas of the law, such as tax, employment, and
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187 (2010); Zachary Liscow,
Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment Preserving Bankruptcy
Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation,
Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579 (2012).
72. For instance, some scholars have argued that courts actually make decisions supporting
government programs in times of crisis, while punishing legislators for economically unsuccessful
initiatives during normal times. See, e.g., Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1194–95 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court makes decisions supporting government programs in times of crisis, while punishing legislators for
economically unsuccessful initiatives during normal times).
73. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2014).
74. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear
Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 756 (2009); Yair J. Listokin
& Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial Crisis, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 349,
369–74 (2018).
75. Listokin & Mun, supra note 74.
76. See Listokin, supra note 1, at 793. In ordinary economic times, when the interest rate is
meaningfully above zero, economic output is determined by the ability to supply goods and services. Id.
at 793–94. When demand is less than this capacity, interest rates fall and restore equilibrium by
incentivizing people to spend rather than save. Id. at 794. These mechanisms fail, however, when interest
rates are at the “lower bound,” and cannot fall further. Id. at 816.
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MBSs began to recover—courts stepped into this breach, stabilizing investor
confidence by allowing trustees to prove their losses by sample.
While not suggested by previous scholarship, courts appear to have quietly
engaged in crisis construction for centuries. In Savile v. Savile,77 the Lord
Chancellor discharged the defendant from a contract to pay an excessive price
for a property on the ground that at the time the contract was made, there was a
“general delusion [of] the nation . . . when there was thought to be more money
in the nation than there really was, which induced people to put imaginary values
on estates . . . .”78 The contract was formed during the investment frenzy
surrounding the meteoric rise of the South Sea Company; the bubble’s explosion
reportedly “ruined” the British credit markets.79
More recently, many Depression-era contracts contained boilerplate “gold
clauses” which required payment either in currency, in specie, or in the value of
the currency in gold at the time the contract was made. President Roosevelt
abolished the gold standard with the objective of deflating the dollar and thus
stimulating the economy; however, such deflation triggered the gold clauses,
payment of which would have bankrupted many American businesses.
Recognizing the problem, Congress passed a joint resolution abrogating these
clauses, which was tenuously upheld by the Supreme Court.80 However, in other
countries, where the abandonment of the gold standard was not accompanied by
a similar statute, some courts nullified these clauses on their own.81
In this section, I first discuss the repurchase cases, and the evidence that
courts disregarded the sole remedy provision in consideration of investors and
the market. I then assess the legal basis for the decisions permitting sampling.

77. (1721) 745, 24 Eng. Rep. 596.
78. Id.
79. See HELEN J. PAUL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ITS ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES 106 (2011).
80. See David Glick, Conditional Strategic Retreat: The Court’s Concession in the 1935 Gold Clause
Cases, 71 J. OF POL. 800, 800 (2009); Georg Vanberg & G. Mitu Gulati, Financial Crises and
Constitutional Compromise, 22 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 2017-59),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033393 [https://perma.cc/UMQ3-RH36].
81. See generally Arthur Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of American Gold
Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 56 (1934) (discussing cases implying a gold value clause).
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A. Repurchase Decisions: A Case Study in Judicial Market-Calming
The series of decisions essentially reading the repurchase remedy out of
RMBS contracts by permitting sampling illustrates that in times of economic
crisis, judges may decide cases to reassure market participants and stabilize the
market. While it is impossible to know whether jurists sat down intending to
stimulate demand because interest rates were at zero—indeed, such specific
motivation seems unlikely—these decisions appear to reflect the sentiment that
perilous economic times called for unusual measures, and that judges should
produce decisions that would make investors whole, increase investor
confidence, and thus stabilize and ultimately help stimulate the battered
economy.
As an initial matter, the timing of these decisions—illustrated in Table 1—
suggests that judicial decision-making may be different in times of crisis. Cases
interpreting the repurchase remedy and the sole remedy provision arose in the
aftermath of the crisis; the statute of limitations in New York on such claims is
six years, and runs from the date that the mortgages were sold,82 so claims
continued to be brought into 2013 and have been working their way through the
courts through 2019. Courts interpreting the repurchase remedy and the sole
remedy provisions to allow sampling achieved momentum amounting to
consensus in the years following the crisis; the first decisions squarely
contradicting this interpretation did not appear until early 2015.83 Even then,
courts continued to hold that the provisions allowed plaintiffs to prove their case
by sample until late 2015,84 which is when the economic recovery began in
earnest.85 More recent decisions reiterating the requirement of loan-by-loan
proof under the PSAs and MLPAs did not appear until 2016 and 2017,86 when
the economy was thriving and the private label-MBS market had begun a slow
but measurable revival.87

82. ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Tr., Series 2006-SL2 v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25
N.Y.3d 581, 599 (2015).
83. See 2015 WL 797972 at *3.
84. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 63, at 15–17;
Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 19 N.Y.S.3d 1, 8–
9 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d as modified, 30 N.Y.3d 572, 92 N.E.3d 743 (2017).
85. See Listokin, supra note 1, at 811 (“[Short-term interest rates] stayed near zero through late 2015
or afterwards.”).
86. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
87. Joe Light, Market for Private-Label Mortgage Bonds is Recovering, But Slowly, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/market-for-private-label-mortgage-bonds-is-recoveringbut-slowly-1453152533 [https://perma.cc/G958-7DBD].
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Table 1.

Second, these decisions occasionally appeared to be calculated with the intent
to restore investor confidence. During the financial crisis, the market for MBSs
seized up, necessitating unprecedented government action.88 Despite this
intervention, demand for MBSs, particularly private-label MBSs, remained
extremely low for years in the wake of the crisis.89 One reason for this extended
paralysis was that investors did not trust banks to honor the contracts for the
assets they sold. For example, Randy Robertson, the managing director of the
investment management corporation BlackRock, opined in 2012 that the MBS
market would not revive until the lion’s share of repurchase litigation had been
resolved.90 The reason was that “investors simply don’t believe that MBS
issuers . . . complied with contractual commitments. ‘Does a contract mean what
the contract says?’ Robertson said. ‘If you change the rules on me and I can’t rely
on a private contract, how do I invest?’”91

88. See Tae Yeon Kim, Pay It Back (TARP Developments), 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 538, 538
(2011) (stating that TARP, among other goals, was intended to “restart credit markets [and] restore
confidence”).
89. See H.R. ____, The Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, Part 1: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 126
(2011) (statement of Janneke Ratcliffe, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress Action Fund, Exec. Dir. of
Ctr. for Cmty. Capital, U.N.C.) (“Four years after the housing crisis began, investors are still slow to reenter the [private-label securities] market.”).
90. Alison Frankel, BlackRock: MBS Market Won’t Revive Until Litigation is Resolved, REUTERS
(June 13, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/06/13/blackrock-mbs-market-wont-reviveuntil-litigation-is-resolved/ [https://perma.cc/98QA-QE4L].
91. Id.
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The rare courts that expressed their reasoning took a similar tack in
endorsing sampling:
It is no secret that the current RMBS market is desperate for new private capital . . . .
Even more threatening to the future of the RMBS market is the lack of respect given to
the repurchase protocol. Banks need to give investors sufficient assurances that, if loans
are actually non-conforming, banks will promptly make good on their repurchase
obligations . . . .92

Paradoxically, the mechanism that the courts used to enforce part of the
contracts most critical to investor confidence—the representations and
warranties—was to hold that the provisions inhibiting recovery—the repurchase
remedy and sole remedy provision—did not mean what they said. However, these
decisions put enough teeth in the representations and warranties that the cases
had significant settlement value, enabling trustees, and through them, the
bondholders, to shift losses to the sponsors who had contracted to bear them.
Such decisions may have sent a signal to nervous investors, helping eventually to
restore investor confidence. Accordingly, these decisions also arguably helped
securitization sponsors as well, even though they were forced to pay out to trusts
and monolines; they themselves were mass holders and producers of MBSs, and
would benefit from resuscitation of the market.
B. Alternative Explanations for the Rise and Fall of Sampling
It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty that judges who permitted
sampling were motivated by the desire to reassure investors and calm the market,
and there are several competing explanations that seem, on their faces, equally
likely. In this subpart, I lay out some alternatives, and explain why investor
reassurance nonetheless appears to be the most plausible explanation.
First, judges may have permitted sampling not out of a desire to help
investors, but to punish sponsors. Judges in the aftermath of the crisis were as
outraged as anyone by the heedless risks taken by banks that imposed such high
costs on the rest of the country, and were in a unique position to force the banks
to internalize some of those costs. However, it seems unlikely that this is the sole
explanation for the allowance of sampling. As further bad facts came to light in
various proceedings and helpful precedent accumulated for vindictive judges to
use, judges solely motivated by a desire to punish the sponsors would have
continued to allow sampling. Instead, the courts largely reversed course in 2016.
Second, it is possible that judges allowed sampling for efficiency reasons. The
high volume and complexity of RMBS cases in the aftermath of the crisis imposed
great demands on the courts, and judges may justifiably have sought procedural
mechanisms to reduce these demands. However, it also seems unlikely that this
is the only explanation. Judges simply looking for a way to resolve these cases
efficiently had a bulletproof option for doing so: enforcing the contracts as
written. Under these circumstances, most plaintiffs would probably have settled

92. Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., No. 650705/2010, 2014 WL 3282310,
at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2014).
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promptly, albeit for much smaller amounts, because the costs of re-underwriting
all of the loans at issue were untenable.
It is likely that the judges who allowed sampling had mixed motives, and that
the explanations above did impact those decisions. However, only an interest in
reassuring investors and making them whole accounts for the timing of these
decisions. During the period that judges allowed sampling, the economy was still
in a degree of disarray, the public was still recovering from the long period of
unemployment, home foreclosure, and other harms that the crisis engendered,
and the government kept interest rates extremely low to aid recovery. As the
recovery progressed and these harms faded from the public consciousness, the
urgency of reassuring investors likely faded as well.
C. Legal Bases for Crisis Construction: Contract Law and the “Echo Chamber”
If courts have a meaningful role in stabilizing the market,93 what is the best
mechanism for fulfilling it? Courts’ decisions are not traditionally guided by
economic policy considerations, but by the content of the law as expressed in
cases and statutes. Resolution of the repurchase cases following the crisis
required the application of contract law. It seems intuitive that contract law, with
its inherent flexibility, should lend itself naturally to more fluid interpretation in
times of crisis. And indeed, some scholarship has explored this possibility in
connection with the financial crisis.94 However, classic contract doctrine was
seldom argued and was never the basis for any decision allowing sampling in the
aftermath of the crisis.
Why was this? The mechanisms that contract doctrine provides for nonenforcement of the sole remedy provision are not bulletproof. Rather than risk

93. It is worth asking why the courts, rather than Congress, should undertake the project of restoring
investor confidence in the aftermath of the crisis. While much of this discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article, I note that the courts, unlike Congress, specialize in resolving contract language
retroactively, rather than prospectively; that they are more flexible and can act more quickly than
Congress in resolving the cases before them; that the courts engaged in these cases were repeat players
in RMBS litigation and decide some of the most sophisticated business litigation in the country; and
finally, that Congress launched many programs designed to restart the MBS market, with very limited
success. Accordingly, in this narrow instance, it does seem that courts have some advantages over
Congress in restoring investor confidence. Moreover, the problems associated with these clauses appear
not to have been detected by other policy-makers. By contrast, where similarly problematic clauses
prevented the modification of mortgages to help stem the tide of foreclosures in the aftermath of the
crisis, courts did not step in. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the Forgotten Law of
Contracts, 87 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2012); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein
Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL L. REV. 1075, 1076
(2009); John D. Gianakoplos and Susan P. Koniak, Matters of Principal, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 2009).
This may be because the executive branch recognized the problem, and the Treasury enacted the Home
Affordable Modification Program to help borrowers modify their loans. See U.S. TREASURY, MAKING
HOME
AFFORDABLE
(2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARPPrograms/housing/mha/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/8GYA-FDY8]. It may be that courts are
less inclined to intervene when a political branch has taken ownership of the problem.
94. For instance, Cohen argues that courts should have used traditional contract doctrines, such as
excuse and unconscionability, to modify loans and mitigate the soaring foreclosures that exacerbated the
recession. Cohen, supra note 93, at 3.
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well-publicized reversal or disagreement from commentators, the courts
permitting sampling reached their results by omitting their reasoning entirely, or
relying on previous cases—even when those cases were poorly reasoned or
inapplicable. Though these decisions created confusing precedent, they quietly
facilitated substantial settlements that reassured investors during a period when
the market for MBSs was virtually paralyzed. In this subpart, I first address
possible contractual mechanisms for allowing sampling, and explain why the
courts did not use these tools. I then discuss how contract doctrine has been
incorporated into very recent repurchase decisions.
Although courts have broad discretion to fashion remedies for contract
breach,95 in the repurchase context, the sponsors and trusts—both sophisticated
parties—constrained that discretion with the sole remedy provision. Traditional
doctrines of excuse, such as commercial impracticability96 and frustration of
purpose,97 seem facially appropriate, and indeed, some decisions even couch their
rulings in language reminiscent of these doctrines.98 But these doctrines apply
when a party is seeking excuse for nonperformance. The trustees had performed
their part of the bargain by paying for the loans; it was the sponsors who were in
breach.
One notable tool that courts plausibly could have engaged to permit sampling
despite the plain language of the agreements is the public policy exception.
Under this exception, courts may choose not to enforce a term where public
policy outweighs the interest in enforcement.99 In making this determination,
courts must consider the interest in enforcing the term and weigh it against the
public interest against enforcement.100 In assessing this public interest, the court
must consider the strength of the public policy as expressed by legislative and
judicial decisions; the likelihood that refusal to enforce the term would actually
further public policy; whether any misconduct was involved, and its seriousness;
and whether there was a direct link between the misconduct and the term.101 A
court may derive public policy precluding the enforcement of a term from either
legislation to prevent such a policy, or the need to protect some aspect of public
welfare.102
It does not seem farfetched to speculate that courts, had they wished to do so,
could have barred enforcement of the sole remedy provision on the ground that
it posed a substantial barrier to an important policy concern: economic

95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
96. Id. § 261.
97. Id. § 265.
98. See Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. 2014 WL 3282310 at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2014) (finding loanby-loan proof “commercially unreasonable” for trustees and therefore allowing sampling).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 179.
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recovery.103 It seems equally plausible to speculate that courts may have allowed
sampling on the public policy basis that parties engaged in misconduct—here, the
RMBS sponsors—should not benefit from the expectation that their contract
terms will be enforced.104
But the courts permitting sampling in the aftermath of the crisis did not do
this. Instead, they essentially turned to a blunt-instrument application of
precedent. As discussed, the earliest cases permitting sampling involved
monoline insurers, which, as well as being third-party beneficiaries to the MLPAs
and PSAs enacted by the trustees and issuers, had their own agreements—the
I&Is—with the sponsors.105 These I&I agreements frequently contained
transaction-level warranties in addition to loan-by-loan warranties, and
specifically allowed the insurer to take any action to recover on amounts owed
by the sponsor.106 Accordingly, it would have been quite plausible to hold that
the monolines were not bound by the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy, as several
courts did.107 However, these early decisions were cited by plaintiffs108 and
courts109 in later decisions allowing sampling where no such exemptive provisions
existed. Many plaintiffs exploited the fiery rhetoric provided by earlier decisions
without following the legal reasoning of those opinions. For example, in Syncora,
the Southern District of New York permitted sampling on the ground that this
approach was permitted by the plaintiff monoline’s I&I.110 The court also
included a blistering footnote:
The repurchase protocol is a low-powered sanction for bad mortgages that slip through
the cracks. It is a narrow remedy (“onesies and twosies”) that is appropriate for
individualized breaches and designed to facilitate an ongoing information exchange
among the parties. This is not what is alleged here . . . . Accordingly, [the sponsor]
cannot reasonably expect the Court to examine each of the 9,871 transactions to
determine whether there has been a breach, with the sole remedy of putting them back
one by one.111

Plaintiffs in subsequent cases pointed to this scathing language to argue that
the repurchase remedy simply had not been intended for the scale of breach that

103. See id. § 178 cmt. e. (“[T]he court will also weigh any interest that the public or third parties may
have in the enforcement of the term in question.”).
104. Id. §§ 195–96.
105. See supra Part III(A).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, No. 11 Civ. 2375(JSR), 2011 WL
5335566, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011); Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 09 Civ.
3106(PAC), 2011 WL 1135007, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 2011).
108. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Letter to Justice Schweitzer at 1–2, Home Equity Mortg. Tr. Series 2006-1 v.
DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 156016/2012, slip op. 50011(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2019), NYSCEF Doc.
No. 229 (citing MBIA v. Countrywide, Assured v. Flagstar, and Syncora v. EMC); Plaintiffs’ Reply
Memorandum in Further Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4, SACO I Tr. 2006-5 v.
EMC Mortg. LLC, No. 651820/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 19, 2015), NYSCEF Doc. No. 521 (citing MBIA
v. Countrywide).
109. See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 63.
110. Syncora, 2011 WL 1135007, at *7.
111. Id. at *6.
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occurred during the crisis.112 Without addressing the reasoning of Syncora and its
reliance on the I&Is, the courts receiving these arguments permitted sampling.
And many decisions permitting sampling cited no authority at all.
These courts built on each other’s opinions to create a line of jurisprudence
that, for several years, unanimously approved sampling in RMBS cases; indeed,
several cited the judicial “consensus” on the issue as the main reason for the
decision.113 These decisions created an echo chamber whereby courts built
momentum for a position that, while textually untenable, promoted the interests
of investors and sent a signal to the market that contracts related to these assets
would be enforced.114
Why did courts rely on inapplicable or nonexistent reasoning to allow
sampling when they could have reached the same results by voiding the sole
remedy provisions on public policy grounds? Possibly because the stakes were
simply too high for failure. Courts across the country are cautious in applying the
public policy exception to void contractual provisions, and are particularly
reluctant to do so where the legislature is silent, or where there is any doubt about
the policy interest to be served.115 While the policy interests served by allowing
sampling are compelling, it is not clear that they would be immune from

112. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law In Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 8, SACO I Tr. 2006-5 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, No. 651820/2012 at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1,
2015), NYSCEF Doc. No. 460; Plaintiffs’ Letter to Justice Schweitzer, supra note 108, at 2. In both cases,
the courts allowed sampling.
113. See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 63, at 15–
16 (“[A]llowing the use of sampling is well-accepted by courts in RMBS cases . . . . [T]he overwhelming
majority that have considered sampling have permitted it as a means to present proof at trial . . . . The
Court adopts this consensus reasoning here”); Part 60 RMBS Put-Back Litig., supra note 62 (“[T]he
courts have overwhelmingly endorsed statistical sampling in the RMBS litigation and this Court concurs
with that approach.”).
114. This echo chamber provides an excellent example of the “butterfly effect” in boilerplate contract
interpretation. See John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1797
n.17 (2019) (“To speak of the ‘butterfly effect’ in boilerplate contract interpretation . . . is to describe the
effect that a single interpretive decision can have on the interests of far-flung parties not involved in the
litigation at hand.”).
115. See, e.g., Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 413 (Cal. 1998) (“Historically, this court has been
reluctant to declare contractual provisions void or unenforceable on public policy grounds without firm
legislative guidance.”); Oronoque Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bargas, No. CV126030490S, 2013 WL
6334111, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2013) (“Generally, however, courts have approached the
prospect of invalidating a contract on the ground that it violated public policy with great caution.”); In re
Guardianship of Huseman, 831 N.E.2d 1147, 1152–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“The courts are reluctant to
restrict the freedom of citizens to make their own agreements. Declaring a contract void and
unenforceable is a power the courts therefore exercise sparingly.”); 720–730 Fort Washington Ave.
Owners Corp. v. Utica First Ins. Co., 893 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) ([W]hen statutes and . . .
regulations are silent, we are reluctant to inhibit freedom of contract by finding . . . clauses violative
of public policy.”) (quoting Slayko v. Sec Mutual Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 2002)); Huey v.
Brand, 92 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), aff’d sub nom. Borger v. Brand, 118 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1938) (“Public policy permits the utmost freedom of contract between parties of full age
and competent understanding . . . and this freedom should not lightly be interfered with by holding that
a contract is contrary to public policy.”) (citation omitted); Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp.,
614 S.E.2d 680, 686–87 (W. Va. 2005) (“Our rule . . . provides that the power of this Court to void a
contract as contravening public policy should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.”).
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challenge. First, stabilizing the economy is not among the standard public policy
interests that courts traditionally defend, which include restraints on trade,
impairment of family relations, and promises involving the commission of a tort
or breach of fiduciary duty.116 Further, these interests diverge in an important
respect from facilitating economic recovery: they are constant, and consistently
require the same kinds of rulings. Calming the market, by contrast, is not a policy
interest that consistently requires defense,117 and it is difficult to predict when
non-enforcement of a contractual term would promote it.
Second, an alternative route to allowing sampling via the public policy
exception would be to void the sole remedy provisions based on the sponsors’
misconduct. In applying this permutation of the public policy exception, courts
consider (1) “the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which
it was deliberate,” and (2) “the directness of the connection between the
misconduct and the term.”118 This may be difficult, because even where evidence
of misconduct exists, it is not clear that the term at issue—the sole remedy
provision—is directly related to it. Similarly, sections 195 and 196 of the
Restatement specifically allow avoidance, on public policy grounds, of provisions
that purport to exempt parties from liability for harms caused intentionally,
recklessly, or as the result of misrepresentation.119 It is arguable that the sole
remedy provision is such a clause. But the provision does not purport to exculpate
the sponsors from liability, or even to severely constrain the amount of damages;
rather, it imposes a procedure for collecting those damages that, in crisis
circumstances, turned out to be extremely costly.
To be sure, these public policy-based arguments might have carried the day,
had judges permitted sampling on that basis. But they almost certainly would
have drawn scrutiny from courts and other commentators, particularly in light of
the general judicial reluctance to void contractual provisions on public policy
grounds. By contrast, the echo chamber provided a quiet, flexible medium for
judges to stabilize investor confidence. These opinions were not front-page news;
they were not facially based on controversial theories, and thus did not draw the
ire of scholars and other commentators. With few exceptions, the consequences
were not on display to the public in the form of a trial; rather, the only effect was
a probable increase in settlement values. This redistributive effect was likely the
assurance that trusts and investors needed to feel that they had been made whole
for the sponsors’ breaches.
These effects could have been much harder to achieve if the courts had been
transparent in basing their decisions on policy grounds. A cumbersome, slow, and

116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186–93.
117. Note that the Restatement generally requires that the public policy interest barring enforcement
of the term exist at the time the contract was made. Id. § 179 cmt. d. This would seem to preclude judges
from barring enforcement of the sole remedy provision in order to promote economic recovery when the
securitizations at issue were created before the economy collapsed.
118. Id. § 178.
119. Id. §§ 195–96.
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expensive appellate process would likely have led to reversal and a deflation of
settlement values. If courts had stated that they were writing provisions out of
contracts in view of the economy or the sponsors’ misconduct, scholars and other
commentators likely would have taken note, and dragged the issue into public
debate. While this would certainly support vigorous examination of law and
policy, it likely would not have given peace of mind to the trusts and investors
whose contracts were at issue; rather, it would likely have promoted greater and
more visible uncertainty in the market about the enforcement of MBS
representations and warranties, further eroding market confidence, and thus
undermining the goal of these decisions. Accordingly, greater transparency may
not have been the optimal tool for judges to use to restore confidence to battered
markets.
This conclusion is reinforced by the continuing narrative of RMBS
repurchase litigation as the market recovered. In 2017, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the sole remedy provision required loan-by-loan repurchase.120
But this was not the end of sampling. In 2018 and 2019, two further decisions
validated sampling, relying on the line of crisis construction cases from the
aftermath of the crisis.121 But these decisions also both included analysis based on
the public policy exception voiding provisions exculpating a party for liability
from gross negligence.122 The reasoning here is suspect—the sole remedy
provision does not purport to exempt sponsors from liability for anything, nor
does it unduly constrain the amount that the trusts may recover for breaching
loans. Moreover, both opinions rely on somewhat strained parallels to New York
precedent on this issue.123 Finally, both cases also involve extreme instances of
alleged bad conduct by the sponsors; the breach rates alleged are 93% and
100%.124
Could the courts permitting sampling in the aftermath of the crisis have made
their decisions on similar grounds? Perhaps. But although apples-to-apples
comparisons are difficult due to varying sampling methodology, it appears that
not all of the earlier cases in which sampling was permitted involved such
egregious misconduct by sponsors; breach rates appear to vary much more
widely.125 This reinforces the idea that the courts’ purpose in permitting sampling
120. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d
572, 603–04 (2017).
121. In re Part 60 Put-Back Litig., 169 A.D.3d 217, 224–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019); Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Tr. Co. for Morgan Stanley Structured Tr. I 2007-1 v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings
LLC, 289 F. Supp. 3d 484, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing RESTATEMENT §§ 195–96).
123. See Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1370–71 (N.Y. 1992) (involving a clause that
purported to limit damages to $55.50); Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416
(N.Y. 1983) (involving a “no-damage-for-delay” clause by a construction company).
124. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. for Morgan Stanley Structured Tr. I 2007-1, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 500
(93% alleged breach rate); In re Part 60 Put-Back Litig., 169 A.D.3d at 220 (100% alleged breach rate).
125. See, e.g., Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc.,
133 A.D.3d 96, 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), aff’d as modified, 92 N.E.3d 743 (2017) (noting that at-issue
trusts alleged breach rates of 45% and 83%); Complaint at 1–2, ACE Sec. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods.,
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in those early cases was to reassure investors rather than solely to punish the
sponsors. Moreover, it is unclear whether the public policy reasoning in these
cases will prove durable, for the reasons discussed above. The decisions explicitly
citing public policy grounds were made once the economy had largely recovered;
the urgency of pressuring meaningful settlements by any means necessary to
bring investors back to the market had faded. Accordingly, the stakes of being
reversed or publicly criticized for transparent but strained reasoning were lower,
and the opacity of the echo chamber approach less appealing.
V
WHY IS THE REPURCHASE REMEDY STICKY?
Despite the problems they seem to engender, the repurchase protocol and
sole remedy provision appear to have persisted in MBS contracts.126 This part
assesses why these provisions seem to have endured. The loan-by-loan
repurchase remedy likely has not been revised because the costs of the revisions
and the assets they create are high. In light of developments after the crisis, the
problems of the provisions are simply not perceived to be sufficiently severe to
incur these costs. Accordingly, trusts may regard the existing provisions as “good
enough.”127 I describe here why the costs of revision are high, and proceed in
subparts V.A and V.B to show why potential benefits of revision are low.
To begin with, a more broadly or easily enforceable remedy would
undoubtedly be costly to sponsors, and this would be reflected in the cost of the
assets themselves. Such a remedy could take the form of transaction-level
warranties enforceable by any means necessary, such as those found in some
I&Is. Recall that these warranties currently apply only to insured securities,
typically the top-rated tranche. The sponsors pay the monolines to insure these
securities, and pass that cost, along with the increased diligence costs associated
with the more comprehensive warranties, along to the investors. Giving
transaction-level warranties to the trusts for entire securitizations would mean
incurring these increased diligence costs for uninsured, less credit-worthy
securities, which investors might not have the appetite to absorb. Similarly, Lewis
and Schwartz have proposed that rather than warranting that the loans
underlying the securities meet certain criteria, sponsors simply warrant the

Inc., No. 650327/2013, 2013 WL 6153206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2013) (alleging a 45% breach rate);
MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgs. Tr. 2006-OA2 v. UBS Real Estate Sec. Inc., No. 12-cv-7322 (PKC),
2015 WL 797972, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015) (37% for trusts at issue in Assured v. UBS).
126. Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t7 (“The second question we ask is why sophisticated market
agents made, and continue to make, unenforceable MBS portfolio contracts.”).
127. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 37–39 (2012) (describing a theory of
“satisficing” contracts, under which parties choose not to revise existing contracts that are “good enough
to serve [their] primary goals.”); see also Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Satisficing Contracts,
77 REV. ECON. STUD. 937, 938 (2010).
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performance of the portfolios that they sell.128 In either case, sponsors would
likely incur increased diligence and repurchase costs to perform under these
contracts, and these increases would be reflected in the price of the mortgages
and MBS.129
Secondarily, the process of actually revising the term could be costly. The
buying and selling of asset-backed securities is a bulk business which requires
significant infrastructure to set up, but can generate large transactions at a high
volume once in place.130 An important component of this infrastructure is the
form contracts used to create these transactions.131 If trusts imposed revision of
the repurchase remedy in these form contracts, sponsors and investors would
have to exert further efforts to price the import of any replacement term on
securities which did not previously carry transaction-level warranties to insurers.
These comprise the majority of the securities, and are less credit-worthy than the
top-rated tranches which may be insured. Assessing the litigation risk for these
securities under transaction-level warranties would likely add friction to a process
designed to market MBSs quickly, at high volume.132
Accordingly, the costs of altering the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy are
potentially high. It is true that the financial crisis graphically illustrated the
problems with these terms; trusts, and through them, investors, had a much
harder time enforcing warranties against sponsors than they likely anticipated,
and were forced to contend with the risk and losses from bad loans that they had
not bargained for. However, in light of developments following the crisis, it
appears that the problems with these provisions are simply not severe enough to
incur the costs involved in changing them. This is likely due to two factors: (1)
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that make specific breaches that proved
problematic less common; and (2) the “crisis construction” jurisprudence holding
that trustees and monolines need not prove breach loan-by-loan.

128. Lewis & Schwartz, supra note 3, at t30–31. In making this proposal, Lewis and Schwartz
acknowledge that it would require an overhaul of current accounting standards and bankruptcy law.
Currently, MBS are appealing to sponsors because they are permitted to book portfolio sales as current
revenue. But if the sponsor guaranteed the portfolio, it would have to account for the potential liability
it would incur as a result. Id. at t30. Further, if sponsors guaranteed the assets they sold, the buyers might
be treated as creditors in the event of the sponsor’s bankruptcy under current bankruptcy law. This would
make the assets informationally sensitive, in that buyers would need to investigate the creditworthiness
of the sponsors before purchase, threatening the liquidity of these products. Id. Accordingly, this
proposal entails costs much higher and broader than an increase in the cost of MBS.
129. See id. at t34.
130. Id.
131. Id. at n.70.
132. Historically, the repurchase remedy also likely benefit from “network externalities;” under this
theory, more commonly used terms are priced by a larger number of market actors, and therefore the
pricing for these terms is more accurate. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 726 (1997)
(“[Contractual network benefits] . . . include the availability of a large number of investors and securities
analysts who will learn how to price a firm’s securities at later public offerings and on the secondary
market.”). However, following the jurisprudence permitting sampling, the meaning of the repurchase
may no longer have a meaning that is sufficiently settled to confer this benefit.
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A. The Impact of Dodd-Frank
Breaches of fraud and appraisal-related representations and warranties were
exceedingly common in loans that were contested in the aftermath of the crisis.
Dodd-Frank took measures to address both, potentially limiting the number of
these breaches likely to occur in the future.133 Accordingly, the odds of litigating
events of mass breach may appear to trusts to be sufficiently diminished such that
revising the repurchase remedy is unnecessary.134
It is well known that the housing crisis was driven in large part by lax
underwriting. Not only did banks lower their standards for borrowers, but they
created loan products requiring vastly less information than conventionally
underwritten loans. Many loan types did not require verification or even
assessment of borrowers’ income or assets, and some did not even require
employment verification.
The low- and no-verification loans types practically invited borrowers to
misstate their incomes and other relevant characteristics in order to procure
larger loans. Such misstatements almost invariably constituted a breach of the
MLPAs and PSAs. First, in many, though not all, transaction agreements,
sponsors warranted specifically against borrower fraud. Even where an
agreement omitted that warranty, virtually all contracts contained a “no default”
representation, warranting that at the time the loans were sold, no circumstance
existed that would constitute a “default” of the mortgage note.135 Standard
mortgage contracts include a clause defining borrower misstatements in
procurement of the loan as an event of default. Accordingly, a loan procured by
a lying borrower would breach a “no borrower fraud” warranty (if there was
one), and a “no default” warranty (which there nearly always was). Such loans
were pervasive in the aftermath of the crisis.
Dodd-Frank reduced the opportunity for these types of breaches. Under
Dodd-Frank, “no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the
133. Lewis and Schwartz, supra note 3, argue that Dodd-Frank does not mitigate the problems of the
loan-by-loan repurchase remedy in that trustees and investors seeking to put back loans to the sponsor
must still demonstrate that the characteristics of individual loans did not live up to the warranties. This
is quite true. However, it was the scale of these breaches that made this provision so problematic. Where
there are fewer breaches to begin with, the loan-by-loan remedy is less odious to enforce. Dodd-Frank
provides several provisions likely to lessen the number of breaches in the first instance.
134. One strand of contract scholarship has assessed the use of vague terms or standards where the
front-end cost of drafting the term is low, and the back-end cost of litigating the term, though high, is
discounted by the remote probability that it will occur. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of Contract interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and
the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006). Other literature has clarified that vague
terms are subject to this calculus because they are costly to verify in court. See generally Albert Choi &
George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (2010). The historical
prevalence of the repurchase remedy likely made it inexpensive to draft, and though it is a hard-to-verify
term in events of mass breach, Dodd-Frank reduced the likelihood of breach. Accordingly, the expense
of litigation is likely discounted.
135. See, e.g., Pooling & Servicing Agreement, SACO I Tr. 2006-5, supra note 26, at 927 (“[T]here
are no material defaults under the terms of the Mortgage Loan . . . .”).
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creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer
has a reasonable ability to repay the loan . . . .”136 To determine a borrower’s
ability to repay, lenders must assess the borrower’s
credit history, current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of
receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the residual income the consumer
will have after paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations,
employment status, and other financial resources other than the consumer’s equity in
the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan.137

To assess these characteristics, the lender must rely on “Internal Revenue
Service Form W-2, tax returns, payroll receipts, financial institution records, or
other third-party documents that provide reasonably reliable evidence of the
consumer’s income or assets.”138 Under regulations by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, certain “plain vanilla” mortgages with no exotic features and
relatively low debt-to-income ratios presumptively satisfy the “ability to pay”
requirement, but even these loans require verification of debts and income.139
Under these rules, which require verification and documentation of borrower
attributes, it is much harder for borrowers to lie about those attributes.
Accordingly, breaches involving borrower fraud, which were so pervasive during
the crisis, are likely to be far fewer post-Dodd-Frank.
Similarly, many MLPAs and PSAs made representations regarding the
process by which properties securing the loans were appraised.140 Many also
warranted loan-to-value ratios, or for second-lien loans, combined loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs or CLTVs) of the loans in the securitization.141 An LTV is the
amount of the loan divided by the value of the property; the value is determined
by an appraisal. In the run-up to the crisis, appraisers were notoriously pressured
by lenders to inflate property values.142 Such pressure and subsequent inflation
would breach warranties of appraiser independence, and any LTV reported as a
result of such appraisals would be artificially low, thus violating LTV warranties.
Again, these particular breaches were pervasive in mortgages leading up to the
financial crisis.

136. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(3).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(4).
139. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2) (2018).
140. See, e.g., Pooling & Servicing Agreement, SACO I Tr. 2006-5, supra note 26, at 928 (“The
Mortgage File contains an appraisal of the related Mortgaged Property signed prior to the final approval
of the mortgage loan application by a Qualified Appraiser, approved by the Company, who had no
interest, direct or indirect, in the Mortgaged Property or in any loan made on the security thereof, and
whose compensation is not affected by the approval or disapproval of the Mortgage Loan.”).
141. See, e.g., id. at 929 (“In the event the Mortgage Loan had an LTV at origination greater than
80.00%, the excess of the principal balance of the Mortgage Loan over 75.0% . . . was insured as to
payment defaults by a Primary Mortgage Insurance Policy. . . . No Mortgage Loan has an LTV over
95%.”).
142. See, e.g., Joe Eaton, The Appraisal Bubble, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 14, 2009),
https://publicintegrity.org/environment/the-appraisal-bubble [https://perma.cc/L5L9-BVQ2].
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Dodd-Frank took steps to address these problems by stiffening appraiser
independence requirements.143 Among other things, the provision prohibits
“seeking to influence an appraiser or otherwise to encourage a targeted value in
order to facilitate the making or pricing of the transaction” and withholding
timely payment for appraisals.144 The provision also requires anyone involved in
a real estate contract who has reason to believe unethical appraisal practices have
occurred to report them to state authorities governing appraiser certification and
licensing.145 The increased emphasis on appraiser independence likely reduces
the instance of these kinds of breaches.
It is possible that diminishing the probability of certain types of breaches that
were common during the mortgage crisis affected the calculus parties undertook
in deciding whether to change or retain the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy.
When breaches infected thousands of loans in each securitization, this provision
was severely problematic. However, if regulation constrains the scale of breach
in the first instance, putting loans back to the sponsor one at a time may not seem
like an unreasonable remedy.
B. The Impact of Crisis Construction
The other post-crisis development that may have influenced the decision to
retain the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy is the line of jurisprudence that
virtually ignored it. The persistence of the repurchase remedy suggests that
courts, at least to some extent, restored confidence in the enforceability of the
representations and warranties notwithstanding the language of the repurchase
provision. The willingness of judges to depart from the language of the PSAs in
order to allow trustees to enforce representations and warranties suggests that
they might do so again. This may lessen the urgency for trustees to attempt
revisions. While later cases indeed interpreted the language of the PSAs to
prohibit sampling, the existence of these cases does not prevent litigants and
courts from making use of earlier cases to lessen the sting of the repurchase
remedy, and as discussed above, some courts have already done so.146
The availability of such precedent may provide reassurance to trustees,
investors, and the market generally that courts may soften this facially draconian
remedy, and are more likely to do so in times of crisis, or where there has been
particularly egregious misconduct by sponsors. This possibility, combined with
the lower likelihood of breach resulting from Dodd-Frank, may have affected
parties’ calculus regarding the retention of the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy.
On the front end, it appears that many of the most pervasive breaches are
unlikely to recur. Even granting the possibility that un-preempted breaches arise
on a pervasive scale, it may appear to parties and the market at large that the
courts would take unusual measures to enforce the representations and
143.
144.
145.
146.

15 U.S.C. § 1639e(b) (2012).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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warranties in such an event. Accordingly, the perceived costs of retaining the
provision, even in light of the problems to which it gave rise, are less than the
costs of changing it.
Thus, the loan-by-loan repurchase remedy is likely to be sticky because the
crisis construction cases give trusts some assurance of recourse in courts.
VI
CONCLUSION
The repurchase cases demonstrate that in moments of economic upheaval,
certain contractual provisions may do more harm than good, and conventional
contract doctrines are not always up to the challenge of mitigating these effects.
Under these circumstances, courts may take matters into their own hands, at least
for the duration of the crisis. Though unusual, ignoring contractual language in
times of crisis is not unheard-of, and may be beneficial in a narrow set of
circumstances. In the case of RMBS contracts, such interpretations may help
explain why the repurchase remedy has endured after the financial crisis.

